2026 BRICS Summit: Egypt Faces an Opportunity to Reshape Its Position in the Global Economy

# BRICS Summit 2026: Egypt Faces an Opportunity to Redefine Its Position in the Global Economy

At a time when the global economy is undergoing rapid transformation, with energy crises, rising oil prices, wars, geopolitical tensions, trade disruptions, supply-chain instability, and the U.S.-China trade war becoming increasingly intertwined, the 18th BRICS Summit is being held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, making it one of the most important summits in the group’s history since its establishment.

The summit comes at a time of extraordinary economic uncertainty. The price of Brent crude has surpassed $105 per barrel, amid continued concerns over energy supplies and maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Disruptions to these strategic corridors could lead to a decline in global oil supplies in 2026 of approximately 5.7 million barrels per day.

This is precisely what makes the New Delhi BRICS Summit particularly significant. It is not merely addressing the future of cooperation among emerging economies; it is taking place at the heart of a broader process of reshaping the global economic order, in which energy and food security, supply chains, financing, and international payments are becoming increasingly important.

India is hosting the 18th BRICS Summit under the theme **“Building Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.”** The theme clearly reflects the priorities of India’s 2026 presidency: building economies that are more resilient to shocks, promoting technology and innovation, expanding cooperation among countries of the Global South, and supporting sustainable development.

The 2026 summit is also particularly significant because it coincides with the 20th anniversary of the emergence of BRICS in its original form in 2006.

BRICS currently comprises 11 countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Indonesia. Together, these countries account for approximately 49.5% of the world’s population, 40% of global GDP, and 26% of global trade, making the group a demographic, economic, and geopolitical force that cannot be ignored.

The group’s membership expanded significantly beginning in January 2024, when Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates joined. Indonesia subsequently became the 11th member in January 2025.

This expansion has fundamentally changed the nature of BRICS. It is no longer simply a grouping of the four major emerging economies that originally formed BRIC. Instead, it has become a bloc spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, bringing together some of the world’s largest energy importers and exporters, major industrial and technological powers, countries with vast natural resources, and economies with large consumer markets.

At the heart of this transformation is Egypt’s participation.

Egypt is attending the New Delhi Summit for the third consecutive time since officially joining BRICS in January 2024, with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi heading the Egyptian delegation.

However, the importance of Egypt’s participation should not be measured merely by its continued political presence, but rather by what Egypt can achieve economically through its BRICS membership.

For Egypt, BRICS must evolve from a political membership into a tool for **growth, investment, and exports**.

Trade between Egypt and BRICS countries increased to $53.5 billion in 2025, compared with $45 billion in 2024. Egyptian exports to BRICS countries rose from $9.451 billion to $13.772 billion, representing growth of approximately 45.7%, while imports increased from $35.549 billion to $39.679 billion.

This means that BRICS membership has already contributed to increasing Egypt’s trade with important markets. However, it also reveals a structural imbalance, as Egypt’s trade deficit with the group remains substantial. The objective, therefore, should not simply be to increase the volume of trade, but to transform its structure in favor of exports, investment, and domestic production.

More importantly, the latest data for the first half of 2026 reinforce this observation. Total trade between Egypt and BRICS countries increased by 25.5% to $36.7 billion, compared with $29.3 billion during the same period in 2025. However, Egyptian imports surged by 38.1% to $30.1 billion.

Egypt’s message here should be clear:

**We do not want BRICS to be merely a market from which we import. We want it to become a platform for production, joint investment, and exports.**

This is precisely where Egypt’s geographic location becomes a strategic economic advantage.

Egypt controls the Suez Canal, has ports on both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, hosts the Suez Canal Economic Zone, possesses a large domestic market, and has trade agreements with African, Arab, and European countries. Consequently, Egypt can become a production and export platform for Chinese, Indian, Russian, and other BRICS companies.

In other words, the model should shift from the concept of trade flowing from China, India, or Russia—BRICS members—to Egypt, toward a model based on industrialization and technology localization **with China, India, Russia, and other BRICS countries in partnership with Egypt**, with production taking place in Egypt for export to Africa, the Arab world, and Europe.

This is undoubtedly where the true value of Egypt’s BRICS membership lies.

China is Egypt’s largest trading partner within BRICS, while India has an important industrial and investment presence in Egypt. More than 700 Indian companies are registered in Egypt, including approximately 70 active factories and companies, with total investments exceeding $5 billion.

Russia, meanwhile, has gained exceptional importance at this stage—not only as a trading partner, but also as a partner in energy, food security, industry, and strategic projects.

The meeting between President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi is therefore particularly significant. During the meeting, President El-Sisi noted that the volume of trade between Egypt and Russia stands at $10 billion, while Cairo and Moscow continue to share a common understanding regarding major projects, foremost among them the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, as well as the continued supply of grain to Egypt amid the current circumstances and crises, particularly the disruption of strategic shipping corridors.

The meeting should also be viewed from a broader economic perspective than simply bilateral relations.

The El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant represents for Egypt a project involving energy, technology transfer, and capacity building. At the same time, Russian industrial cooperation within the Suez Canal Economic Zone could create opportunities for production targeting the Egyptian market as well as African and Arab markets.

Food security has also become an essential component of Egypt’s economic security, particularly given Egypt’s substantial reliance on grain imports, including imports from Russia and Ukraine—most notably wheat, corn, and barley. This makes the stability of supply chains a strategic issue rather than merely a trade matter.

The importance of this issue increases amid the current energy crisis.

Oil prices above $105 per barrel do not merely mean higher gasoline or petroleum-product prices. They also mean higher transportation, insurance, shipping, industrial, and food costs, thereby increasing inflationary pressures on energy-importing economies.

For Egypt, higher oil prices represent a challenge to the budget and import costs. At the same time, however, they create an opportunity, because disruptions to global supply chains increase the strategic importance of countries that possess key geographic locations, ports, trade corridors, and industrial infrastructure.

Egypt can therefore benefit from the crisis rather than merely absorb its consequences—provided that it succeeds in transforming the Suez Canal and its economic zone into a hub for manufacturing, storage, logistics, and re-export activities.

This is where President El-Sisi’s remarks at the BRICS Summit regarding the energy crisis and energy security become particularly important. His vision goes beyond simply dealing with higher oil prices toward a broader concept of economic security.

The current energy crisis demonstrates that energy is no longer merely a commodity bought and sold in markets. It has become one of the determinants of national security, economic stability, and a country’s ability to achieve growth.

When oil and gas prices rise sharply, the impact extends beyond the energy import bill to the public budget, foreign currency availability, inflation, production costs, transportation, and food prices—and ultimately to citizens’ purchasing power.

Therefore, President El-Sisi’s discussion of energy security should be understood as part of an integrated economic equation:

**Energy security ultimately means budget security, industrial security, food security, and foreign-exchange security.**

Egypt faces a particularly sensitive equation because it is an energy-producing country that may nevertheless need to import part of its gas or petroleum-product requirements at certain times. Consequently, higher global prices can turn part of domestic savings or revenues into additional pressure on the import bill and the state budget.

The strategic solution, therefore, does not lie solely in seeking additional sources of oil and gas. It also requires diversifying the energy mix, expanding renewable energy and nuclear power, improving energy efficiency, and reducing fuel intensity in industry and transportation.

Every unit of energy saved ultimately means a dollar saved from the import bill.

This highlights the importance of the El Dabaa project, solar and wind power, electricity grids, and expanded electricity interconnections. Diversifying energy sources not only reduces exposure to external shocks, but also creates a new foundation for industrial development and investment.

More importantly, energy security can be transformed from a financial burden into a competitive advantage if Egypt succeeds in providing stable and competitively priced energy to factories and investors.

Industrial investors are not looking only for land, incentives, and tax exemptions. They also need electricity, gas, water, transportation, ports, and energy at stable prices on which they can base their investment plans.

The global energy crisis can therefore provide Egypt with an opportunity to position itself as a regional industrial and logistics hub, particularly if energy is effectively integrated with ports, industrial zones, and export centers.

The second highly important issue raised by President El-Sisi in his remarks is the issue of **fiscal space**.

The President clearly pointed out that debt and limited fiscal space have become increasingly pressing challenges for countries, and called for reform of the international financial architecture, the development of innovative and concessional financing instruments, and a stronger role for the New Development Bank.

This is not an Egyptian issue alone. It is a challenge facing most emerging economies.

When debt-servicing costs rise, governments’ ability to direct resources toward investment in education, healthcare, infrastructure, energy, and industry becomes constrained. Economically, this is known as a reduction in fiscal space.

The problem becomes even more serious when an energy crisis occurs at the same time.

If oil prices rise, import costs increase, social-support or protection needs may rise, while the government’s ability to absorb additional shocks is weakened by higher debt-servicing costs.

The equation therefore becomes very clear:

**Higher energy prices + higher financing costs + greater social-protection needs = narrower fiscal space.**

For this reason, the President’s call for reform of the international financial system is not merely a political appeal; it has a direct impact on developing countries’ ability to finance development.

For Egypt, expanding fiscal space does not simply mean increasing revenues or reducing expenditure. It means improving the quality of public spending, increasing private-sector participation, transforming public investment into investment that generates economic returns, increasing exports and foreign direct investment, reducing financing costs, and reprioritizing expenditure.

Egypt’s budget for fiscal year 2026/2027 targets revenues of approximately EGP 4 trillion and expenditures of around EGP 5.1 trillion, with a targeted primary surplus of approximately EGP 1.2 trillion, equivalent to 5% of GDP. This reflects an attempt to create greater room for debt management and social protection at the same time.

However, the real challenge is that any new shock in energy or food prices could place pressure on this fiscal space.

Therefore, energy security is not a separate issue from fiscal reform. It is one of the conditions required to preserve fiscal space itself.

BRICS can become more important for Egypt if it evolves from merely a forum for dialogue into a platform for securing concessional development financing and funding projects in energy, transportation, water, industry, and logistics, thereby reducing reliance on high-cost commercial financing.

This brings us to an important point:

**The objective is not more borrowing, but smarter financing.**

Financing should be linked to projects capable of generating revenues, earning foreign currency, reducing the import bill, increasing production, or expanding exports.

For example, if Egypt secures concessional financing for a renewable-energy project that reduces fuel imports, such financing should not be viewed merely as new debt, but as an investment in reducing demand for foreign currency.

Likewise, if a logistics or industrial project is financed in a way that increases exports, its economic returns can contribute to servicing the financing itself.

The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS to finance infrastructure and sustainable-development projects, can therefore become an important instrument—provided that Egypt moves beyond proposing massive infrastructure projects and instead develops a portfolio of economically viable, financeable projects capable of attracting private-sector participation and foreign investment.

Another issue that could become one of the most important outcomes of the New Delhi Summit is **payments and local currencies**.

It is important to correct a common misconception here: BRICS is not necessarily moving toward the creation of a unified currency in the near future.

The more realistic direction is the development of cross-border payment systems, the integration of financial and digital infrastructure, and greater use of national currencies in trade and investment.

This is highly important for Egypt because reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar in certain trade transactions could lower conversion costs and reduce the need to use the dollar as an intermediary currency, particularly in trade with countries that have significant trade volumes with Egypt.

However, success in this area requires a gradual approach, because national currencies differ significantly in strength and stability. In addition, trade imbalances between countries can make local-currency settlements more complicated.

Another issue that Egypt should prioritize is the **New Development Bank (NDB)**, established by BRICS to finance infrastructure and sustainable-development projects.

The real value of the bank for Egypt does not lie simply in membership. It lies in Egypt’s ability to transform major projects in energy, transportation, water, digitalization, and industry into projects that are financially viable and eligible for funding.

In my view, Egypt should focus during the coming phase on five clear economic objectives from its BRICS membership:

1. **Increasing Egyptian exports to BRICS countries;**
2. **Attracting direct industrial investment;**
3. **Transferring and localizing technology;**
4. **Increasing development financing;**
5. **Developing mechanisms for trade using national currencies.**

Egypt should gradually aim to increase its exports to BRICS from approximately $14 billion currently to $20 billion and then $25 billion, with a focus on value-added products rather than merely primary commodities.

Egypt should also seek to attract Chinese, Indian, Russian, Emirati, Saudi, Indonesian, and Brazilian companies to manufacture inside Egypt, rather than simply allowing their products to enter the Egyptian market.

Most importantly, Egypt should capitalize on its position as a bridge between BRICS and Africa.

A country capable of offering an Asian or Russian investor not only access to its domestic market but also a gateway to African, Arab, and European markets will be better positioned to attract long-term investment.

Nevertheless, BRICS should not be viewed as an immediate alternative to the Western economic system or the U.S. dollar.

There are significant differences within the group itself—between China and India, between Russia and Western countries, and between Iran and some Gulf states. Member countries also have differing interests in trade, politics, and energy.

The more realistic future for BRICS is therefore the development of a more multipolar global economic system with multiple centers of power, rather than the abolition of the existing system and its overnight replacement with another.

This is where the importance of Egypt’s balanced policy lies.

Egypt does not need to choose between BRICS and the West. Instead, it can engage with all sides according to its economic interests.

BRICS membership should serve as a tool for diversifying partnerships, markets, sources of financing, and investment—not as an instrument for entering into political or economic polarization.

The New Delhi Summit undoubtedly represents, for Egypt, a transition from the stage of **“membership”** to the stage of **“maximizing the returns from membership.”**

Egypt’s success in BRICS will not be measured by the number of summits it attends or the number of joint statements issued.

It will be measured by the number of factories established, the volume of new investments attracted, the value of exports generated, the amount of technology localized, the number of jobs created, and the volume of imports that can be replaced by domestic production.

The broader strategic objective should be to transform Egypt into an economic platform connecting BRICS with Africa and the Arab world and Europe.

Egypt possesses the geographic location, the Suez Canal, the market, the workforce, infrastructure, ports, economic zones, and diversified trade relationships.

What remains is to maximize the value added generated from these advantages through **industry, technology, investment, and exports.**

From this perspective, President El-Sisi’s meeting with President Putin carries economic significance extending beyond Egyptian-Russian relations.

It represents a model for what Egypt’s participation in BRICS should become:

**Strategic partnerships that turn into projects; projects that turn into production; production that turns into exports; and exports that generate foreign currency, employment, and economic growth.**

Most importantly, President El-Sisi’s address at the summit presented a highly significant economic equation:

**Sustainable development cannot be achieved without energy security; energy security cannot be achieved without investment and financing; financing cannot be secured without fiscal space; and fiscal space cannot be expanded without growth, exports, investment, and production.**

This is the cycle that Egypt must work to complete in the coming years.

The world is moving not only toward political multipolarity, but also toward multiple centers of production, financing, energy, technology, and trade.

If Egypt succeeds in making effective use of its BRICS membership, it can move from being a country participating in a rising economic bloc to becoming a pivotal player connecting the emerging centers of the global economy with African and Arab markets.

The real opportunity for Egypt is not simply to be a member of BRICS.

**It is to make BRICS invest, produce, and export from Egypt.**

Only then can membership be transformed from a diplomatic achievement into genuine economic power—from participation in summits into an influential presence on the map of the global economy.

**Dr. Abdelmoniem El-Sayed**
**Financial Advisor**
**Director, Cairo Center for Economic and Strategic Studies**